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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
subcontracting or senority provisions when there is no express no-
removal clause. Such an approach, as a rule of construction, would
recognize in a mild way the policies discussed herein.
In conclusion, the thesis here is neither that the Board should al-
together remove the runaway shop from the unfair labor practice
category, nor that reasonable contractual safeguards against the im-
pact and surprise of plant relocation should be declared void. Rather
it is submitted only that fresh thinking on the subject, giving greater
weight to contemporary economic realities and to enunciated national
economic goals, must be undertaken.
E. WALTER BOWMAN
Religion and the Public Schools
I. INTRODUCTION
The first amendment to the United States Constitution contains a
dual command with respect to governmental involvement with re-
ligion: government must "make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Although some
have insisted that the first amendment requires a strict separation of
church and state, the conclusion is inescapable that the two clauses
were intended to operate together in harmony. It is apparent, there-
fore, that the conflicting policies of the "no establishment" clause and
the "free exercise" clause must be balanced and reconciled. The
United States Supreme Court has held that this balancing effort leads
to a duty of neutrality-a duty which forbids the state either to ad-
vance or to inhibit religion. Although the neutrality concept will
affect many different types of governmental activity, its greatest ap-
plication would appear to be in the public school situation. It is the
purpose of this paper to examine the various public school activities
involving religious aspects in an effort to determine which ones consti-
tute breaches of the duty of neutrality and which ones are permissible
accommodations in the interest of religious liberty.
II. APPLICATiON OF TIE NEUrRALrrY CONCEPT BY Tm
UNnED STATES SuPREME CoURT
A. The Constitutional Command
Although the great bulk of American colonists came to the New
World in search of religious freedom, they were initially unable to
resist the temptation to structure their political machinery so as to
promote their own religious convictions. At the time of the Revolu-
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tionary War, there were established churches in at least eight colonies,
and the Protestant groups were given preferred treatment in at least
four of the other five.' Following the Revolution, opposition to these
establishment practices began to intensify. By 1784 the minority re-
ligious groups in Virginia had become an effective political force.
Led by James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, they successfully op-
posed Patrick Henry's proposed tax levy for the support of the teachers
in the Episcopal schools. Public support for Madison's thesis that
true religion did not need the support of law swelled rapidly, and
early in 1786 the Virginia legislature enacted the famous "Virginia
Bill for Religious Liberty," by which all religious groups were placed
on an equal footing.
2
Pledged to establish religious freedom for the nation as he had
done for Virginia, Madison proposed a constitutional amendment
guaranteeing religious liberty shortly after taking his seat in the first
Congress.3 In its final form, the first article of the Bill of Rights de-
clared that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ."4 Although
it has been suggested that the congressional objective was merely to
prevent the establishment of a national church,5 the overwhelming
weight of authority ascribes a much broader scope to the amend-
ment.6
1. The Church of England was the established church in Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia. The Congregational Church was officially
established in New Hampshire, Connecticut and Massachusetts. Although New York,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware had no established churches, they did discrimi-
nate against Catholics. See S. CoB, THE RzsE OF RElmous LmuaRTr iN AmICA
337-38, 408 (1902). See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 n.10 (1962).
2. The history of the Virginia episode is treated extensively in the opinions in
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Virginia statute provided "That
no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or
ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened in his
body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
belief. .. ." H. CommAGER, Docummrs OF ArnmcAx HIsToRY 125 (1944).
3. Madison's amendment read: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established,
nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 39 n.27 (1947) (Rut-
ledge, J., dissenting). For a summary of the congressional history behind the first
amendment, see Chief Justice Warren's opinion in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 440-45 (1961). See also Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress and The
Schools: An Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REv. 1395 (1966).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. J. STORY, COl IENTAIrES ON TH CONSITMTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1874,
1877 (3d ed. 1858).
6. In his concurring opinion in the Sunday closing law case, Mr. Justice Frank-
furter set forth his view of what the "no establishment" clause was intended to ac-
complish: "What Virginia had long practiced, and what Madison, Jefferson and others
fought to end, was the extension of civil government's support to religion in a manner
which made the two in some degree interdependent, and thus threatened the freedom
of each. The purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the national
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Inasmuch as the "no establishment" and "free exercise" clauses of
the first amendment were not incorporated into the fourteenth amend-
ment and applied to the states until 1940,7 the major decisions con-
struing these clauses have all come within the past twenty-four years.
The first case to reach the United States Supreme Court involving
"Religion and the Public Schools" was West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.8 There the public school authorities had ex-
pelled several pupils of the Jehovah's Witness faith for refusing to
salute the United States flag and to recite the pledge of allegiance.9
The Court held that this action by the school officials violated the
first amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of
religion. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Jackson said:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein.10
The next major church-state case, and the first in which the Supreme
Court was called upon to interpret the "no establishment" clause, was
Everson v. Board of Education." Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Black said:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church at-
tendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, par-
legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious end; that
it would not, as Virginia and virtually all of the colonies had done, make of religion,
as religion, an object of legislation. . . . The Establishment Clause withdrew from
the sphere of legitimate legislative concern and competence a specific, but compre-
hensive, area of human conduct: man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some
transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief or disbelief." Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 465-66 (1961).
7. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
8. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
9. The beliefs of the Jehovah's Witnesses include a literal interpretation of Exodus
20:4-5, which commands: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any
likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that
is in the water under the earth; Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve
them .. " They consider the flag to be a "graven image" within the meaning of
this commandment; hence, they refuse to salute it.
10. 319 U.S. at 642.11. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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ticipate in the affairs of any religiods orgahizhtions or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion y
law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."' 2
Applying this test to the question of whether it was constitutional
for New Jersey to reimburse parents for money expended in trans-
porting children to parochial schools, the Court held (five to four)
that New Jersey had not breached the "wall of separation." Although
it appears that the Court would have disapproved the use of public
funds for the support of parochial schools, the majority invoked the
"child benefit" theory13 to sustain this transportation reimbursement.
The majority opinion emphasizes that New Jersey had done "no more
than provide a general program to help parents get their children, re-
gardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from ac-
credited schools."' 4
B. Released Time:
The second major case which called for an application of the "no
establishment" clause was that of McCollum v. Board of Education.5
There the public school authorities of Champaign, Illinois, had co-
12. Id. at 15-16. The origin of the phrase "a wall of separation between church
and State" generally is traced to Thomas Jefferson's letter of Jan. 1, 1802, to the
Danbury Baptists. The letter is set forth in J. O'Namr RELION AN EDUCATION UNDER
SCoNsTrTrUnON 286 (1949).
13. Under the "child benefit" theory, governmental expenditures which give in-
direct aid to parochial schools are upheld on the ground that they are welfare measures
designed primarily to benefit the pupils rather than to aid religion. For a discussion
of the theory, see Cushman, Public Support of Religious Education in American Con-
stitutionai Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 337-49 (1950); La Noue, The Child Benefit
Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportation and Medical Care, 13 J. PuB. L. 76 (1964).
The theory has been used by a few state courts to sustain the use of public funds for
transporting children to and from parochial schools. See Fox v. Board of Educ., 93
N.J. Super. 544, 226 A.2d 471 (1967); Rhoades v. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202, 226 A.2d
53 (1967); Squires v. City of Augusta, 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959) (dictum);
Board of Educ. v. Wheat, 174 Md. 134, 199 A. 628 (1938). However, a large
number of state courts have repudiated the theory in the parochial bus situation.
E.g., Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963); State ex rel. Reynolds
v. Nusbaum, 17 Wis. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962); Matthews v. Quinton, 362
P.2d 932 (Alas. 1961); Snyder v. Town of Newton, 147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770
(1960); McVey v. Hawkins, 364 Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953); Visser v. Nooksack
Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949); Silver Lake Consol.
School Dist. v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29 N.W.2d 214 (1947); Opinion of the Justices,
216 A.2d 668 (Del. 1966). The "child benefit" theory has also been used to sustain
state laws which allow textbooks to be loaned to students attending parochial schools.
See Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Chance v. Missis-
sippi State Textbook Rating & Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
Other courts, however, have refused to invoke the theory to uphold textbook loan laws.
See Dickman v. School Dist., 232 Ore. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961); Haas v. Independent
School Dist., 69 S.D. 303, 9 N.W.2d 707 (1943). For a discussion of the "child
benefit" theory in the textbook situation, see 20 VAND. L. REV. 640 (1967).
14. 330 U.S. at 18.
15. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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operated with a local association of churches in a released time pro-
gram. Under the program, those pupils whose parents had signed
requestcards were permitted to attend religious instruction classes
conducted by teachers furnished by the association. These classes were
held during school hours in the school buildings. Students who did
not choose to take the religious instruction were required to continue
their regular secular studies. Expressly reiterating the principle an-
nounced in Everson that the state cannot pass laws which "aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another, "" the
Court held the released time program unconstitutional because it
amounted to a utilization of the public school system to aid religious
groups in spreading their faith. Mr. Justice Black, once again speak-
ing for the Court, said:
[T]he First Amendment rests upon the premise that both religion and
government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere. . . . Here not only are the
State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of
religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable
aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use
of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation
of Church and State.17
In Zorach v. ClausonPI the Court showed some retreat from the
broad scope of the Everson-McCollum principle. Although the New
York City released time program in issue in Zorach involved a co-
operative effort between civil and ecclesiastical officials very similar
to thp Champaign plan, it was distinguished on two grounds: the
religious instruction was conducted off the school premises, and there
was no evidence that the school authorities had used coercion to
foster attendance. The Court viewed the New York City plan as
nothing more than an adjustment of the public school schedule to
accommodate the religious needs of the children. Speaking for six
members of the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas said:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being .... When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates
with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions.... Government may
not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend
secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one
or some religion on any person .... But it can close its doors or suspend
its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary
for worship or instruction.19
16. Id. at 210,
17. Id. at 212.
18. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
19. Id. at 313-14.
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Mr. Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent in which he emphasized
that the coercive power of the state was being used to aid religion.
He concluded that "New York is manipulating its compulsory educa-
tion laws to help religious sects get pupils. This is not separation but
combination of Church and State."20
In light of the more recent school prayer and Bible reading cases,
it does not appear that Zorach has undermined the Everson-McCollum
principle to any great extent.21 Yet Zorach has been cited frequently
for the proposition that the establishment limitation must be balanced
against the free-exercise principle and that a state may, in the interest
of neutrality, choose to advance the free exercise of religion at some
expense to the establishment limitation.22
C. Prayer and Bible Reading
1. The Historical Development.-The practice of opening the school
day with prayers and Bible readings has a long history. In 1684 the
Rules of the New Haven Hopkins Grammar School required that the
teacher "every morning begin his work with a short prayer for a
blessing on his Laboures and their learning. . . ."23 A 1682 contract
with a Dutch schoolmaster in New York required four prayers during
each school day.24 Although public schools gradually supplanted the
private academies between 1800 and 1850, morning devotional exer-
cises were generally retained. Yet Eastern educators, whose schools
were exposed to religious diversities as a result of swelling immigra-
tion, soon began to question the soundness of opening the school day
with compulsory prayer or Bible reading. In 1843 the Philadelphia
School Board declared that no pupils would be required to listen to
the reading of the Bible if their parents were "conscientiously opposed
thereto."25 A decade later, the New York Superintendent of Schools
issued a decree against prayers in the public schools and declared that
Catholic students could not be compelled to listen to readings from
the King James Bible.26 An even bolder position was taken by the
Cincinnati Board of Education; in 1869 it resolved that "religious
20. Id. at 318.
21. See A. STOES & L. PFEFFER, C iRCH AN STATE IN T UNITED STAT, 103
(1964).
22. See Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MicH. L. REv.
1031, 1049 (1963).
23. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 267-68, ('i963) (Brennan, I.,
concurring).
24. Id. See also W. DUNN, WAT HAPPENMD TO RELIGIous EDUCATION? 21-22:
(1958).
25. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 272.
26. Id.
1967 ] 1083
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instruction and the reading of religious books, including the Holy
Bible, are prohibited in the common schools of Cincinnati .... ,,27
Although the overwhelming majority of state courts sustained de-
votional exercises in the public schools, it is significant that six state
supreme courts held such exercises to violate their respective state
constitutions.2 Doremus v. Board of Education30 was the first Bible
reading case to reach the United States Supreme Court. Apparently
not yet ready to rule on the merits,31 the Court dismissed for lack of
standing.32
2. State-Composed Prayers.-A full decade passed before the Court
said anything further concerning "Religion and the Public Schools."
Finally, in 1962 the Court heard arguments in the case of Engel v.
Vitale.3 The New York State Board of Regents had composed a
"non-sectarian" prayer and had recommended that it be recited daily
in the New York public schools. The prayer read: "Almighty God,
we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy bless-
ings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country."3 The Court
held, by a six-to-one vote, that the use of the prayer violated the "no
establishment' clause, even though the prayer was denominationally
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Carden v. Bland, 199 Tenn. 665, 288 S.W.2d 718 (1956); Kaplan v.
Independent School Dist., 171 Minn. 142, 214 N.W. 18 (1927); Wilkerson v. Rome,
152 Ga. 762, 110 S.E. 895 (1922); Church v. Bullock, 104 Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115
(1908); Hackett v. Brooksville Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905);
Billard v. Board of Educ., 69 Kan. 53, 76 P. 422 (1904); Pfeiffer v. Board of Educ.,
118 Mich. 560, 77 N.W. 250 (1898); Moore v. Monroe, 64 Iowa 367, 20 N.W. 475
(1884).
29. State ex rel. Finger v. Weedman, 55 S.D. 343, 226 N.W. 348 (1929); State
ex rel. Deare v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 173 P. 35 (1918); Herold v. Parish Bd. of
School Directors, 136 La. 1034, 68 So. 116 (1915); People ex rel. Ring v. Board of
Educ., 245 I1. 334, 92 N.E. 251 (1910); State ex rel. Freeman v. Scheve, 65 Neb.
853, 91 N.W. 846 (1902); State ex rel. Weiss v. District Bd., 76 Wis. 177, 44 N.W.
967 (1890). For a discussion of these cases, see D. BoLEs, THE BmLx, RmIoN, AND
THE PUBLIC ScHooLs 108-32 (1965); Harrison, The Bible, the Constitution and Public
Education, 29 TENN. L. REv. 363, 386-89 (1962); Note, Bible Reading in Public
Schools, 9 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1956).
30. 342U.S. 429 (1952).
31. See R. DmNAN, RELoON, m CouRTs, AND Punuc Poricy 93 (1963).
32. For a discussion of the standing question, see notes 210-16 infra and accompany-
ing text.
33. 370 U.S. 421 (1962), noted in 16 VAND. L. REv. 205 (1962).
34. Dean Drinan observed that although the prayer is not trinitarian or Christian,
it is "clearly theistic." He explained that the Regents justified this preference of one
religion over another by making reference to the "spiritual heritage of the nation and
the undeniable reality of a theistic commitment underlying the legal and'moral insti-
tutions of the country." R. DniuNA, supra note 31, at 100. Although the prayer received
strong support from most Protestant and Catholic church leaders, some charged that
it was bound to deteriorate into empty formality and would be of little spiritual sig-
nificance. A. SToXEs & L. PFEma, supra note 21, at 377.
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neutral and its observance on the part of the students was voluntary.5
Once again speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Black said:
There can, of course, be no doubt that New York's program of daily
classroom invocation of God's blessings as prescribed in the Regents' prayer
is a religious activity. It is a solemn avowal of divine faith and supplica-"
tion for the blessings of the Almighty. . .. [Sitate laws requiring or per-
mitting use of the Regents' prayer must be struck down as a violation of
the Establishment Clause because that prayer was composed by govern-
mental officials as a part of a governmental program to further religious
beliefs.36
In answer to respondent's contention that the practice should be
upheld because of its voluntary nature. Mr. Justice Black declared
that government mental coercion is not a prerequisite to a violation of
the "no establishment" clause. Rather, the clause is violated whenever
"the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief."3
3. The Response to Engel.-The Engel decision was greeted with
a storm of protest. Bishop James A. Pike of the Episcopal Church
declared that the Supreme Court had "deconsecrated" the nation, and
he called for a constitutional amendment to reverse this "lockout of
God."38 Cardinal Spellman, after announcing that he was "shocked
and frightened" by the decision, exclaimed that it "strikes at the very
heart of the Godly tradition in which America's children have for so
long been raised."39 And evangelist Billy Graham referred to the
decision as "another step toward the secularization of the United
States" and observed that "the framers of our Constitution meant we
were to have freedom* of religion, not freedom from religion."40
Dean Erwin Griswold of the Harvard Law School attacked the
decision for its use of a "fundamentalist theological" and "mechanical-
ly absolutist" approach. He would prefer to use a "comprehensive"
or "integral" approach whereby all the provisions in the Constitution
would be examined in a "living setting."4' Under this approach he
would sustain the use of the state-composed prayer as a means of
teaching members of minority groups a lesson in tolerance.42
35. The petitioners, who were challenging the constitutionality of the Regents' prayer,
included Jews, Unitarians, Ethical Culturalists and one nonbeliever. W. Doucr-s, THE.
BmLE An m ScHoor-s 17 (1966).
36. Engel, v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962).
37. Id. at 431.
38. W. ICAz, Paaroo Am AmmucAs CoNsrrtroNs 35-36 (1964).
39. Id.
40. A. Sr cos & L. PFEFEmR, supra note 21, at 378 (emphasis added).
41. Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme-
Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. RLv. 167, 172-73 (1963).
42. Id. at 176-77. Dean Griswold reasoned as f.olows: "The -child of a non-
conforming or minority group is, to be sure, different in his beliefs. That is what
19671 NOTES 1085
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
4. Bible Reading and the Lord's Prayer.-In the midst of this
outburst of public dissent, the Supreme Court handed down another
major church-state decision in the companion cases of Abington
School District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett.43 At issue in the
Schempp case was the validity of a Pennsylvania law requiring the
reading without comment of ten verses from the Holy Bible at the
beginning of each school day.4 The Murray case involved no statute;
rather the petitioners were challenging the practice of daily Bible
reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer which the Baltimore school
authorities had approved for the Baltimore public schools. After re-
affirming the Everson-McCollum principle that government may not
"aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another,"
the Court laid down a test for determining whether governmental
activity violates the first amendment: governmental activity is un-
constitutional if either its purpose or primary effect is the advance-
ment or inhibition of religion.45 By an eight-to-one vote, the Court
held that the morning exercises in question were intended to advance
the Christian religion; hence, there was a violation of the first amend-
ments command that "Government maintain strict neutrality, neither
aiding nor opposing religion."46 As in Engel, the Court held that the
voluntary nature of the exercises was no defense to a challenge under
the "no establishment" clause.47 Neither was the Court impressed
it means to be a member of a minority. Is it not desirable, and educational, for him
to learn and observe this, in the atmosphere of the school-not so much that he is
different, as that other children are different from him? And is it not desirable that,
at the same time, he experiences and learns the fact that his difference is tolerated
and accepted? No compulsion is put upon him. He need not participate. But he,
too, has the opportunity to be tolerant. He allows the majority of the group to follow
their own tradition, perhaps coming to understand and to respect what they feel is
significant to them." Id. at 177.
43 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court decided Schempp and Murray in a single
opinion.
44. Id. The Pennsylvania statute was amended in 1959 to permit any child to be
excused from the Bible reading exercises upon the written request of his parent or
guardian. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1962).
45. 374 U.S. at 222. Professor Choper has proposed a slightly different test. He sug-
gests that the "no establishment" clause is violated "when the state engages in what
may be fairly characterized as solely religious activity that is likely to result in (1)
compromising the student's religious or conscientious beliefs or (2) influencing the stu-
dent's freedom of religion or conscientious choice." Choper, Religion in the Public
Schools: A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 47 Mnuqr. L. Rnv. 329, 330 (1963).
46. 374 U.S. at 225.
47. At the trial Edward Schempp explained why he had decided not to request
that his children be excused from the morning exercises. The trial court summarized
his testimony as follows: "He said that he thought his children would be 'labeled as
"odd balls"' before their teachers and classmates every school day; that children, like
Roger's and Donna's classmates, were liable 'to lump all particular religious. dif-
ference[s] or religious objections [together] as "atheism"' and that today the word
'atheism' is often .connected with 'atheistic communism,' and has 'very bad' connota-
tions, such as 'un-American' . . . with overtones of possible immorality. Mr. Schempp
pointed out that due to the events of the morning exercises following in rapid suc-
1086 [ VOL. 20
with the defense that the religious practices in question were only
minor encroachments on the first amendment. Speaking for the ma-
jority, Mr. Justice Clark cautioned:
The breach of neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too
soon become a raging torrent and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper
to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties."4
Finally, the Court rejected the contention that the command of
strict neutrality, which does not permit a state to require a religious
exercise even with the consent of the majority of those affected,
collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion. Mr.
Justice Clark declared:
While the Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action
to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a
majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs.
49
5. Compliance with Schempp.-Once again the Supreme Court was
inundated with a flood of criticism. An editorial in the Wall Street
Journal declared that the Court had established atheism as "the one
belief to which the State's power will extend its protection."50 Bishop
Pike commented that "[t]he result of the decision is not neutrality
but an imposition upon the public school system of a particular per-
spective on reality, namely, secularism by default, which is as much
an "ism' as any other."51 Cardinal McIntyre of Los Angeles stated
that the decision "can only mean that our American heritage of
philosophy, of religion and of freedom are being abandoned in imita-
tion of Soviet philosophy, of Soviet materialism and of Soviet regi-
mented liberty." Cardinal Cushing of Boston expressed the view that
the Communists were no doubt taking great pleasure in the decision,
and Cardinal Spellman of New York asserted that no one who be-
lieves in God could approve of such a holding.
52
Other religious leaders hailed the Schempp ruling as a great bul-
wark to the preservation of religious liberty. The Right Reverend
cession, the Bible reading, the Lord's Prayer, the Flag Salute, and the announcements,
excusing his children from the Bible reading would mean that probably they would
miss hearing the announcements so important to children. He testified also that if
Roger and Donna were excused from Bible reading they would have to stand in the
hall outside their 'homeroom' and that this carried with it the imputation' of punish-
ment for bad conduct." Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F. Supp. 815, 818 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
48. 374 U.S. at 225.
49. Id. at 226.
50. W. KA-=, supra note 38, at 97.
51. Id.
52. A. STOKS & L. PFEFFEn, supra note 21, at 381. Legal scholars have also dissented
from the Engel and Schempp decisions. See, e.g., C. FacE, Tim SUPREmE CoURT A
Ptmuc PBAYER (1964); Hanft, The Prayer Decisions, 42 N.C.L. Rv. 567 (1964).
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Arthur Lichtenberger, Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church, de-
clared that the .decision was in keeping with "the Court's sense of
responsibility to assure freedom and equality to all groups of be-
lievers and non-believers as expressed in the First Amendment of the
Constitution."53 Dr. Eugene Carson Blake and Dr. Silas G. Kessler,
executive officers of the United Presbyteriarn Church, issued a state-
ment declaring that the decision had "underscored our firm belief
that religious instruction is the sacred responsibility of the family and
the Churches."54 Similar thoughts were expressed by Rabbi Uri Miller,
president of the Synagogue Council of America (which represents
Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed Judaism) and by the National
Council of Churches.
55
In the midst of this dialogue among theologians, many politicians
were expressing their disapproval of the Schempp decision. State
officials in at least four states announced that they would ignore the
decision,56 and rumblings of a constitutional amendment echoed
through the halls of Congress.57 This critical attitude even found
expression in state courts in which church-state issues were pending.
When requested to strike down the Florida Bible reading statute,
the Florida Supreme Court boldly declared in Chamberlin v. Dade
County Board of Public Instruction58 that the Schempp neutrality
command had not been breached. Inasmuch as the preamble to the
statute made reference to "good moral training," "a life of honorable
thought," and "good citizenship," the court concluded that the Bible
reading practice was founded upon secular rather than sectarian con-
siderations.5 9 The United States Supreme Court was unimpressed with
53. See D. BoLEs, supra note 29, at 266.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 265-67. The National Council of Churches also issued the following
statement: "The full treatment of some regular school subjects requires the use of
the Bible as a source book. In such studies-including those related to character
development-the use of the Bible has a valid educational purpose. But neither true
religion nor good education is dependent upon the devotional use of the Bible in
the public school program." Quoted in L. Pnm~sa, CmucH, STATE AM FFrMoM 474
(rev. ed. 1967).
56. See C. RicE, supra note 52, at 7. Gov. George Wallace of Alabama boldly de-
dared: "I want the Supreme Court to know we are not going to conform to any such
decision." He further stated that, if the courts rule that the Bible cannot be read in
an Alabama school, "I'm going to that school and read it myself." Beaney & Beiser,
Piayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schempp on the Political Process, 13
'.'Pun. L. 475, 486 (1964).
57. Over ninety congressmen introduced constitutional amendments designed to
overturn the Schempp decision. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at 382.
58. 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964).
59. Id. The Florida court relied on McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961),
wherein the Supreme Court upheld a Sunday closing statute on the ground that its
purpose and effect were not to aid religion, but to set aside a day of rest and
recreation." % I
1088 [ VOL. 20
this attempt to distinguish the Florida pr'actice from those presented
in the Schempp case, and it reversed per curiam.
Although several states sought to justify the continuance of Bible
reading in the public schools on the theory that the Schempp decision
applied only to legislative enactments and not to "local custom"
61
other states made a dedicated effort to comply without any "chi-
canery."62 In New Jersey and Pennsylvania, for example, the governors
threatened local school districts with the loss of state aid if they did
not comply. And in at least two instances state officials obtained in-
junctions to force compliance by defiant school districts.63
III. CONTINUATMN OF RELIGIOUS EXERCISES IN AN ALTERED Fomv
A. Teacher-Sponsored Prayers
Suppose a kindergarten teacher has her pupils recite the following
prayer each morning prior to their partaking of milk and cookies:
God is Great, God is Good
And we thank Him for our Food, Amen.
And suppose that before afternoon classes begin the children recite-
this "thank you" verse:
Thank You for the world so sweet
Thank You for the food we eat
Thank You for the birds that sing
Thank You God for everything.
Further, suppose that the board of education orders the teacher to
discontinue the prayers. Do the parents of any -of the kindergarten
children have any grounds for complaint?
These were the facts in Stein v. Oshinsky," in which a group of
parents alleged that their children had been denied the free exbrcise
of religion and asked that the school officials be ordered to afford
60. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Ins^truction, 377, U.S. 402 (1964).
Other Bible reading statutes have been summarily invalidated -by lower federal and
state courts. See Johns v. Allen, 231 F. Supp. 852 (D. Del..1964); Adams v..Engelking,
232 F. Supp. 666 (D. Idaho 1964); Attorney Gen. v. School. Comm., 347 Mass. 775,
199 N.E.2d 553 (1964); Sills v. Board of Educ., 42 N.J. 351, 200 A.2d 615 (1964)..
61. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 56, at 488-89.
62. Id.
63. Id. Of the twenty-nine states which reported 'Bible reading in their public
schools before the Schempp decision, only five have completely abolished the practice,
according to a 1965 survey. In fourteen, Bible reading exists in scatter~d areas; and in
six, it continues as it did before the decision. Katz, Patterns of Cotnpliance with- the
Schempp Decision, 14 J. PuB. L. 396, 403 (1965).-
64. 24 F. Supp. 757 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).' The cage'at the, district' court' 'ev'dl is
discussed in 32 FoEDHAm L. REv. 852 (1964) aiid i964 U. ILI,. L.F; 465....
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their children "an opportunity to express their love and affection to
Almighty God each day. .... 6" Finding that participation in the
prayers was completely voluntary and that the exercise was not pre-
scribed by any law,68 the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted the injunction. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the
"free exercise" clause does not require a state to tolerate prayers of
any type in its public schools. 67 Speaking for the court, Judge Friendly
said:
After all that the states have been told about keeping the "wall between
church and state . . . high and impregnable," it would be rather bitter
irony to chastise New York for having built the wall too tall and too
strong.6
Since the petitioners were fighting "for" rather than "against" these
kindergarten prayers, the court was not called upon to decide the
"no establishment" question. It would seem clear, however, that the
Engel holding extends to teacher-sponsored prayers, since the teacher
is an agent of the state.69
The "no establishment" question was presented in Despain v. De-
kalb County Community School District.70 There the kindergarten
teacher used the familiar "thank you" verse, but she deleted the word
"God" so that the last line read "We thank you for everything."
When the pupils recited the verse, they were required to fold their
hands in their laps; and there was evidence that some of the pupils
voluntarily said "Amen" or crossed themselves as they concluded the
recitation. At the trial, Episcopal and Presbyterian theologians testi-
fied that the verse constituted a prayer, with or without the word
65. 224 F. Supp. at 757.
66. The court apparently was trying to distinguish these "teacher-sponsored" prayers
from the "state-composed" prayer of Engel.
67. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 957
(1965). The case at the circuit court level is discussed in 46 B.U.L. REv. 106 (1966)
and 17 SYRAcusE L. RIv. 745 (1966). One writer has argued that in prohibiting
any manifestation of a theistic belief, New York took action with the purpose and
primary effect of advancing Secular Humanism; hence, in denying relief to the
petitioners, the court inadvertently sanctioned an establishment of religion. Note,
Church-State-Religious Institutions and Values: A Legal Survey-1964-66, 41 NoTnr
DAmm LAw. 681, 707 (1966).
68. Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir. 1965). Judge Friendly justified
this wide discretion placed in the school officials as follows: "Against the desire of
these parents that their children [be given an opportunity to pray), the [school]
authorities were entitled to weigh the likely desire of other parents not to have their
children present at such prayers, either because the prayers were too religious or not
religious enough." Likewise the school authorities would be entitled to consider "the
wisdom of having public educational institutions stick to education and keep out of
religion, with all the bickering that intrusion into the latter is likely to produce." Id.
69.- See Ladd, Public Education and Religion, 13 J. PuB. L. 310, 39,5 (1964).
70. 255 F. Supp., 655 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
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"God."7' 1 The court, nevertheless, upheld the use of the verse on the
ground that the purpose was not to inculcate religion, but "to instill
in the children an appreciation of and gratefulness for the world about
them."72
It would seem obvious that a devotional attitude accompanied the
recitation of this verse. Although the word "God" has been removed,
there remains a four-fold "We thank you." Clearly, the "you" is
intended to refer to someone who is thought to provide everything,
and such connotations would seemingly be offensive to non-theists.
Kindergarten verses, it is submitted, should not stand or fall merely
by reference to terminology. Rather the test should be whether the
purpose or primary effect is to aid or oppose religion. Whatever the
purpose, the primary effect (as demonstrated by the devotional atti-
tude) was surely to prefer theism over non-theism; hence, use of
the verse is a breach of the duty of neutrality.
B. Student-Initiated Prayers
The Engel and Schempp decisions would not appear to forbid truly
student-initiated prayers during school hours, as long as they are
conducted in a manner which does not interfere with the regular
school activities73 and which does not infringe upon the rights of
children having no desire to participate. 4
1. The Reed Plan.-Such an "accommodation" approach was utilized
by the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan in Reed v. Van Hoven .75 There the court formulated a plan
designed to insure the neutrality of the public school officials with
respect to religion, while at the same time protecting both the rights
of students desiring to manifest their religious beliefs and the rights
of those preferring to refrain from such activity. The plan included
four basic elements: (1) students who wish to say a prayer or
read scripture either before the school day begins or after it ends
should be permitted to do so, provided that there is a general com-
mingling of the entire student body as the students finish the morning
exercise and head for class;7 6 (2) such exercises must be completed
71. Dr. John E. Burkhart of the McCormick Theological Seminary said: "It does
not stop being a prayer when the word 'God' is removed, since the children . . . use
it and understand it as a prayer. So, in common context it is a prayer which has
simply been modified, but has not lost its prayer connotation or meaning." Id. at 658.
72. Id. at 664.
73. See Pfeffer, Court, Constitution and Prayer, 16 RurrGas L. REV. 735, 749-50
(1962).
74. See Note, supra note 67, at 708.
75. 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
76. The court suggested that the students desiring to participate in the morning
exercises meet in a room other than their regular homerooms; hence, a commingling
of students at the close of the exercise would be assured.
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at least five minutes before the start of the regularly scheduled school
day or must not begin until at least five minutes after completion of
the regularly scheduled school day;"7 (3) no bells should be sounded
to indicate either the beginning or ending of these devotional periods;
(4) if a teacher is present at the pre-school or post-school sessions, his
only function should be to maintain discipline.
Although it can be argued that, under the Reed plan, the school
officials breach their duty of neutrality in permitting the use of public
property for the advancement of religion, it can also be argued that
the refusal to allow such student-initiated prayers gives rise to an
inference of state hostility toward religion.78 Since Schempp com-
mands that the state refrain from either inhibiting or advancing re-
ligion, the Reed plan would seem to be an acceptable accommodation
as long as it does not operate to discriminate among "religions.""0
2. Prayer Rooms.-The designation of one particular room as a
prayer room" should not affect the legality of the plan; it would
merely be for the convenience of the supervisory personnel charged
with keeping order in the school building. It would be inadvisable,
however, to decorate the room with religious symbols or altars. Such
permanent items, even though purchased with private funds, could
easily be the basis for an establishment of religion charge, inasmuch
as they would probably discriminate in favor of the majority religion.
Even if those who would be offended by the religious symbols would
never have any reason to go near the prayer room, the mere fact that
the symbols were there would be strongly suggestive of an attempt
to advance religion.
3. Period of Silence.-The Engel and Schempp decisions would not
appear to forbid the school officials from setting aside a period of
silence at the Beginning of each school day.80 There is a difference
between prescribing religious practices and allowing opportunity for
them. To give students an opportunity to meditate or pray would not
appear to constitute an advancement of religion; rather it would ap-
77. The time gap was thought necessary in order to insure that those students who
participate in the exercises are separated from the official activity of the school.
78. In explaining the command of neutrality in the Schempp case, Mr. Justice Clark
said that "the State may not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of
affirmatively cpposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who
believe in no religion over those who do believe."' 374 U.S. at 225.
79. The term "religion" apparently encompasses non-theistic and philosophical
beliefs. See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), where a requirement that an
appointee to the office of notary public declare his belief in the existence of God was
held to violate the "free exercise" clause.
80. See Mr. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963). See also P. FnEUND & R. ULICH, RELIGION AND
THE PUBLIC ScHooLs 23 (1965).
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pear to be a permissible accommodation in the interest of religious
liberty.81
The period of silence may also be justified on the ground that it
has a valid secular purpose.a Children frequently engage in games
or noisy conversation as they journey to the schoolhouse, and school
officials might well determine that a period of silence at the beginning
of the school day is a useful expedient for calming the students so
that they are prepared to undertake their studies seriously. Any
reverent attitude which would prevail during the silent period would
be merely incidental to the secular purpose of quieting the students. a8
4. Grace before Lunch.-The state has clearly violated its duty of
neutrality if a public school teacher says grace before the noon meal.
Since such conduct would be "necessarily sectarian,"M it would
amount to the advancement of religion. For the same reason, it would
be improper for school officials to place prayer cards on the lunchroom
tables.
On the other hand, it would be entirely appropriate for the stu-
dents to say their own private prayers before eating. Furthermore,
it would appear to be permissible for the school officials to set aside
a few moments of silence at the beginning of the lunch hour, and any
students desiring to say grace could do so during this period.8 5
C. Patriotic Ceremonies
1. Patriotic Songs.-In a footnote to the majority opinion in the
Engel case, Mr. Justice Black indicated that it was permissible for
public school students to sing "officially espoused anthems which in-
clude the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being.
It has been generally agreed that the "Star Spangled Banner"8 7 is such
81. See P. KAuPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITI-MON 94-95 (1964).
82. See Choper, supra note 45, at 371.
83. Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, supra note 59. There the Supreme Court held
that any assistance which Sunday closing laws might give to religion would be merely
incidental to the secular purpose of setting aside a day of rest and recreation.
84. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 415.
85. In the Reed case, Judge Fox approved a private meditation period at the
beginning of the lunch hour, 237 F. Supp. at 55-56.
86. The entire footnote reads as follows: "There is of course nothing in the decision
reached here that is inconsistent with the fact that school children and others are
officially encouraged to express love for our country by reciting historical documents
such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references to the Deity or by
singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith
in a Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public
life of belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblence
to the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in this
instance." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
87. The "Star Spangled Banner" was declared the national anthem in 1931. 36
U.S.C. § 170 (1964).
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an "officially espoused anthem" even though the third stanza expresses
some of the same sentiments found in the New York Regents' prayer.
The singing or recitation of "America" would also appear to be proper
despite the fact that the fourth stanza is in essence a prayer.89 Ap-
parently there will be no objection to the inclusion of religious ele-
ments in a patriotic ceremony where the patriotic purpose is para-
mount and the religious reference only incidental."
Although it has been suggested that patriotic songs should be used
only on a voluntary basis,91 Mr. Justice Black's footnote does not say
that it would be unconstitutional to make participation mandatory.
It is to be observed, however, that he speaks of school officials' "en-
couraging" students to sing patriotic songs.
If participation in a certain patriotic song would violate a student's
religious beliefs, it would obviously be improper for the school of-
ficials to impose a sanction for non-participation. Hence, the action
of a principal in expelling Jehovah's Witnesses for their refusal to
stand for the singing of the National Anthem constitutes an unrea-
sonable infringement upon the right of free exercise of religion.92
2. Flag Salute.-In 1954 the Congress amended the pledge of al-
legiance to the flag to read: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the
United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands,
one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."9 3
Whether the insertion of the words "under God" renders the pledge
improper for use in the public schools has been a question of con-
siderable debate since Engel and Schempp.94 It has been argued that
88. See R. DnAmN, supra note 31, at 112; Choper, supra note 45, at 411; Kauper,
supra note 22, at 1052. The third stanza of the "Star Spangled Banner" reads: "Blest
with victory and peace, may the heav'n rescued land Praise the Power that bath
made and preserved us a nation Then conquer we must, when our cause it is just,
And this be our motto-'In God is our Trust."'
89. See Ramsey, How Shall We Sing the Lord's Song in a Pluralistic LandP, 13
J. PuB. L. 353, 395 (1964). See also Choper, supra note 45, at 411; Pfeffer, supra note
73, at 750. The fourth stanza of "America" reads: "Our fathers' God, to Thee, Author
of Liberty, to Thee we sing. Long may our land be bright with freedom's holy light,
protect us by Thy might, great God our King." The Board of Education of New York
City decided not to use the prayer recommended by the State Board of Regents;
instead, it directed the city schools to open the school day with a recitation of the
fourth stanza of "America." Pfeffer, supra note 73, at 737.
90. See Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 774 (D. Ariz. 1963); Kauper, supra
note 22, at 1052; Note, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in
the Public Schools, 63 COLxUm. L. BEv. 73, 96-97 (1963).
91. Reed v. Van Hoven, supra note 75, at 56.
92. Sheldon v. Fannin, supra note 90. The Jehovah's Witnesses support their refusal
to stand by reference to Daniel 3:13-28. There three Hebrews (Shadrach, Meshach,
and Abednego) refused to bow down at the sound of musical instruments playing
patriotic music throughout the land at the order of King Nebuchadnezzar of ancient
Babylon.
93. 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1964) (emphasis added).
94. See Note, supra note 90, at 97.
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the congressional action in inserting the words "under God" had no
purpose or effect other than the advancement of religionf 5 Without
attempting to examine the congressional purpose the New York courts
upheld the recitation of the amended pledge in Lewis v. Allen96 on
the ground that participation was voluntary. The Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari97 has been interpreted by some to mean that its
holdings in Engel and Schempp will not be extended.98 It would seem
more likely, however, that the Court denied certiorari because it con-
siders the pledge of allegiance to be a patriotic ceremony within
the meaning of Mr. Justice Black's footnote in Engel. Surely it is
just as patriotic to pledge allegiance to the flag as it is to sing the
National Anthem. The patriotic purpose being paramount, incidental
references to religion should not be a ground for attack as long as
participation is voluntary.99
3. Readings from Historical Documents.-Mr. Justice Black's foot-
note in the Engel case also speaks of encouraging public school stu-
dents "to express love for our country by reciting historical documents
such as the Declaration of Independence which contain references
to the Deity. . . ."10 Other historical documents which have been
judicially approved for use in the schools include the Northwest Ordi-
nance, Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, John F. Kennedy's
inaugural address and the various Presidential Thanksgiving procla-
mations. 101 Although certain passages in these documents emphasize
the nation's religious heritage and although they may well have the
effect of "working in" the love of God,102 their use is apparently
justified on the ground that they are not "distinctively religious"
documents.0 3 Once again, a certain amount of aid to religion ap-
pears to be permissible if it is incidental to a lawful secular purpose.
Readings from the writings of the world's great philosophers or from
the works of noted poets and playwrights would probably meet the
"historical document" test as long as neither the purpose nor primary
effect is the advancement of religion. Poetry which is constructed on
95. See Note, supra note 67, at 710.
96. 5 Misc. 2d 68, 159 N.Y.S.2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 11 App. Div. 2d 447,
207 N.Y.S.2d 862 (3d Dep't 1960), aff'd per curiam, 14 N.Y.2d 867, 200 N.E.2d 767,
252 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1964).
97. 379 U.S. 923 (1964).
98. See Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1964, at 2, col. 2. The article began with the follow-
ing statement: "Although it didn't put anything in writing, the Supreme Court appears
to have signaled that there are limits to its demand of separation of church and state."
99. See Reed v. Van Hoven, supra note 75, at 56.
100. For the full footnote see note 86 supra.
101. Reed v. Van Hoven, supra note 75, at 55.
102. See Ramsey, supra note 89, at 395-96.
103. See Kauper, supra note 22, at 1052.
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a religious theme or which makes repeated references to the workings
of God would not be permissible. Also improper would be readings
from purely religious drama.104
D. Bible Stories
The use of Bible stories for the purpose of instilling religious values
in the students would certainly fall into the same category as Bible
reading and would thus be unconstitutional. 10 5 Although one court
has held that public school teachers may tell no Bible stories of any
type, 06 it has been suggested that stories with "low religious impact"
and "high human interest" would withstand the aid to religion test.107
It has been further suggested that there is an important distinction
between telling Bible stories about the life of Christ from an his-
torical standpoint and telling stories about the miracles of Christ from
a religious standpoint.10 8 Whether the constitutional command of neu-
trality would permit such a distinction is at present an open question.
The dilemma which a teacher would face, however, in selecting only
stories of "low religious impact" and in presenting them from an
historical standpoint would appear to mitigate against the practice.
Moreover, in situations where parents have complained about the use
of Bible stories, school officials probably would be inclined to adopt
a complete prohibition against such stories rather than become en-
tangled in the difficult task of determining which stories would and
which stories would not violate the duty of neutrality.
E. Teaching Morality and Virtue
The public school shares with the home and the church the tasks
of building and strengthening the moral character of the nation's chil-
dren. These tasks may be accomplished by the reading aloud of
works of "edification" at the beginning of the school day,10 9 or they
may be accomplished by classroom discussions on such topics as
morality, ethics, or good citizenship." 0 Even in the absence of any
104. The use of sacred documents would be proper in connection with a course in
comparative religion. See note 185 infra and accompanying text.
105. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 414.
106. Reed v. Van Hoven, supra note 75, at 56. Judge Fox also suggested that themes
should not be assigned on such topics as "Why I believe or disbelieve in religious devo-
tions."
107. Ladd, supra note 69, at 339.
108. Harrison, supra note 29, at 414.
109. RAMSEY, TEACING "VIRTUE" IN THE PuBuc SCHOOLS, 1963 RELIGION AND THE
Prmuc OaER 336 (Giannella ed. 1964).
110. Note, Humanistic Values in the Public School Curriculum: Problems in Defining
an Appropriate "Wall of Separation," 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 795, 809-13 (1966).
Professor Kauper has suggested that it would be entirely proper for the public schools
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formal presentation, the teacher may well have ample opportunity
to stress moral values. In the course of a school day, the teacher may
frequently find himself in a position to exemplify such qualities as
justice, love, kindness, idealism, humility, honesty, responsibility,
temperance and respect for authority."' Although the teacher must
not engage in religious indoctrination as he endeavors to teach mo-
rality and virtue,112 the duty of neutrality would .not appear to pro-
hibit reference to the fact that moral values and religious principles
often coincide." 3 Any religious atmosphere that would thereby be
created would be merely incidental to the secular purpose of build-
ing good moral character.
IV. VALIDIY OF OTHER PBicrICES CONTAINING REFERENCES
TO RELIGION
A. Observance of Holy Days
1. Pageants and Programs.-Public school observance of holy days
is clearly an unconstitutional activity if conducted in a devotional
setting." 4 That allowance is made for joint religious observances,
such as Christmas-Hanukah and Easter-Passover, does not cure the
infirmity, for the Constitution prohibits the states from aiding one
religion, aiding all religions, or preferring some religions over others."5
The suggestion that Christmas and Easter have lost their religious sig-
nificance" 6 and have become national holidays in the same category
as Thanksgiving Day and Washington's Birthday"17 would surely be
disputed by the nation's religious leaders.
to "afford opportunity for exploration and discussion of ethical issues and permit a
child to give expression to ethical insights derived from his own faith." P. KAuPER,
supra note 81, at 97.
111. See L. PFEFgFR, supra note 55, at 366; Choper, supra note 45, at 377-78.
112. While an Illinois statute demands that "Every public school teacher shall teach
the pupils honesty, kindness, justice and moral courage for the purpose of lessening
crime and raising the standard of good citizenship," the legislature has declared that
the statute "shall not be construed as requiring religious or sectarian teaching."
ILL. RE.V. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 27-12, 27-16 (Smith-Hurd 1962).
113. It has been suggested that the students adhering to theistic beliefs might be
deprived of their free exercise of religion if the discussions concerning moral values
excluded the possibility that God is the "fountainhead from which moral principles
spring." Note, supra note 110, at 813.
114. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla.
1962); Pfeffer, supra note 73, at 750; Rosenfield, Separation of Church and State in
the Public Schools, 22 U. Prrr. L. RFv. 561, 572 (1961).
115. See A. SToKEs & L. PFEFFEa, supra note 21, at 383-84; Choper, supra note 45, at
411-13; Rosenfield, supra note 114, at 572. For a discussion of various instances where
public school observance of holy days has given rise to community turmoil see
PFFFER, supra note 55, at 479-96.
116. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 416.
117. See A. STolrs & L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at 383.
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It is submitted, therefore, that the schools should refrain from any"celebration" of religious holidays. There should be no worship ser-
vices of any type, no religious pageants,"" and no exhibition of films
which are primarily religious in nature.119
On the other hand, it would appear to be entirely appropriate for
public school teachers to "acknowledge and explain" the various holy
days. 20 In fact, the American Association of School Administrators
has recently recommended that the public schools recognize religious
holidays "in the spirit of exposition of the differing rites and customs
of families, cultures, and creeds-each with deep meaning for its ad-
herents, and in sum revealing the many different religious, philosophi-
cal, and cultural practices and beliefs held by Americans."'2'
2. Sacred Music.-The constitutional command of neutrality clearly
prohibits the use of religious hymns in a devotional setting. They
may, however, be sung as a part of a course in music appreciation
since this is a secular activity.'22 School choirs and orchestras may
properly make use of religious music, including Christmas carols, as
long as their performances do not take place in a devotional setting.
Although the duty of neutrality would not appear to forbid public
school officials from setting aside a period of silence at the beginning
of the school day, the period could well be turned into a devotional
setting if sacred music were played over the public address system.
It is submitted, therefore, that it would be improper to use sacred
music in connection with the period of silence. On the other hand,
religious music would appear to be unobjectionable as a part of a
musical assembly if the primary purpose is to entertain-not to in-
doctrinate.' 3
3. Religious Symbols.-Although it has been suggested that it is
proper for public school teachers to acknowledge and explain re-
118. See Ladd, supra note 69, at 325.
119. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla.
1962). Professor Choper has noted that the occasional showing of motion pictures
depicting religious happenings may be of considerable educational value. Choper,
supra note 45, at 413. It seems doubtful, however, that he would sanction the use of
religious films for devotional purposes; he would very likely restrict their use to history
classes or to objective religion courses.
120. In 1963 the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church adopted a
lengthy report on church-state relations. Among other things, the report recommended
that "Religious holidays be acknowledged and explained, but never celebrated reli-
giously, by public schools or their administrators .... ." Quoted in PF.rFEa, supra
note 55, at 492. See also Church-State Report, Presbyterian Life, June 15, 1963, at
10; Rosenfield, supra note 114, at 573.
121. Quoted in L. PFEFrER, supra note 55, at 492. For a more detailed discussion of
the recommendations of the association see BoLE S, supra note 29, at 292-95.
122. See Choper, supra note 45, at 413; Pfeffer, supra note 73, at 750.
123. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 415.
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ligious holidays, 124 such explanations should not be accompanied by
a display of religious symbols or pictures. It is indisputable that the
presence of a Crucifix or a Star of David would tend to create a
religious atmosphere. The display of such symbols, even on a tempo-
rary basis, would appear, therefore, to violate the schools duty of
neutrality. Pictures of distinctively religious events and placards con-
training the Ten Commandments'21 or other sectarian mottoes would
also tend to create a religious atmosphere; hence, their presence in
public school classrooms would appear to be just as unconstitutional
as the presence of religious symbols. 126 On the other hand, there
would probably be no objection to such seasonal decorations as pine
trees, wreaths, bells, candles, poinsettias, lilies, colored eggs or rabbits,
as these items merely reflect the joy and good will of the season and
have only incidental religious connotations.2 7
References to religious painting, sculpture and architecture in an
art class would appear to be beyond question. Many of the world's
great artistic accomplishments are centered on religious themes, yet
the religious element is definitely incidental to the artistic qualities.128
Whether an art teacher may assist his students in creating religious
symbols which would violate the aid to religion test if placed on dis-
play by the school officials is a more difficult question. It is likely that
the answer will turn on the purpose and primary effect of such ac-
tivity. If the purpose is to teach students to paint or draw or sculpture,
then the fact that the creation is a religious symbol should be of
no consequence. On the other hand, if the purpose is to construct a
religious display for use in the school lobby, then the art room ac-
tivity takes on aid-to-religion characteristics. 29
4. Nativity Scenes.-The erection of nativity scenes on public school
premises generally has been held constitutional on the ground that it
constitutes a mere "passive accommodation of religion."130 The courts
have emphasized that the scenes were displayed only during the
school's Christmas recess and at no expense to the school district.131
124. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
125. A North Dakota statute requires "a placard containing the ten commandments
of the Christian religion to be displayed in a conspicuous place in every schoolroom,
classroom, or other place where classes convene for instruction." N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 15-47-10 (1960).
126. See Choper, supra note 45, at 408-09.
127. Id. at 412.
128. Id. at 386.
129. But see Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21,
35 (Fla. 1962), where the court refused to enjoin a display of religious symbols be-
cause it was a work of art created by the students and was set up only on a
temporary basis.
130. Lawrence v. Buchmueller, 40 Misc. 2d 300, 243 N.Y.S.2d 87, 91 (Sup. Ct.
1963).
131. Id.; Baer v. Kolmorgen, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
1967 ] NOTES 1099
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
It also has been suggested that permission for religious displays on
public property should be granted on a non-discriminatory basis. 32 The
conclusion is inescapable, however, that the mere presence of a na-
tivity scene constitutes a dedication of the premises to the Christian
faith.13 The scene probably would be offensive to Jews and other non-
Christians, and undoubtedly some Christians would look upon it as a
place of worship.1" That the school district granted permission for the
erection of religious displays on a non-discriminatory basis, that they
were erected only during the holiday recess, and that the costs were
borne by the sponsoring church are not determinative of the constitu-
tional question. The question is whether the action of the school dis-
trict has the purpose or primary effect of aiding one religion, aiding
all religions, or preferring one religion over another. The answer is
obvious. By sanctioning the use of its property for the display of a
nativity scene, the school district aids the Christian religion in gen-
eral;13 if the sponsoring church attaches its name to the scene, it
aids one sect in particular; finally, it prefers the Christian religion
over non-Christian beliefs. Patently, then, the presence of a nativity
scene on public school property constitutes an establishment of re-
ligion.
B. Baccalaureate Services
The practice of holding baccalaureate services in connection with
graduations falls in the same category as the celebration of religious
holidays. If the baccalaureate service is held under public school
sponsorship or auspices, whether in the school or elsewhere, it is
clearly unconstitutional. 136 And the infirmity is not cured by making
attendance voluntary. 37 Neither is it cured by the use of an "inter-
faith" approach. 38 The mere holding of the service violates the com-
132. See Church-State Report, supra note 120, at 10.
133. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at 384.
134. In State ex rel. Singelmann v. Morrison, 57 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 1952), the
court decided that a statute or monument erected on public property violated the
"no establishment" clause if it was designed and used as a public shrine or place
of worship, if it was used for the propagation of a religious belief, if it was intended
to hold some other religious group in public contempt and ridicule, or if it was
designed to cause religious strife and antagonisms.
135. The plaintiff's brief in Lawrence v. Buchmueller, supra note 130, at 90,
stated that "objection is made . . . not on the basis of any religious antagonism
with the creche as a symbol-but, rather, precisely because it is symbolic of a basic
tenet of the Church and, as such, has no place in a secular atmosphere.
136. See Rosenfield, supra note 114, at 573.
137. See Choper, supra note 45, at 407.
138. Some school districts have felt that baccalaureate services are unassailable if
clergy from the Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish and Greek Orthodox communities
are invited to participate.
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mand of neutrality, for the purpose and primary effect is manifestly
the advancement of religion. 39
Baccalaureate programs were challenged in the Chamberlin case,
but the Florida courts held that the plaintiffs had no standing to
present the issue because none of them had children of high school
age.140 The United States Supreme Court, Justices Black and Douglas
dissenting, affirmed this portion of the Chamberlin holding under the
Doremus doctrine. 141 The issue will surely arise again and will be
resolved, it is submitted, under the Schempp "purpose or primary ef-
fect" test.
If a local religious group undertakes to sponsor a baccalaureate
service in one of the local churches and invites all members of the
graduating class to attend, there could be no objection because the
activity does not have public school sponsorship. 42 This practice is
free from attack, however, only where school officials (board mem-
bers, principals and teachers) refrain from participation in any way.
In other words, the principal should not make any remarks; in fact,
it would be advisable that he not even sit on the platform.
The fact that the holding of baccalaureate services in public schools
appears to be unconstitutional does not preclude the schools from
inviting members of the clergy to speak at assembly programs or
commencement exercises. Clergymen, like educators and politicians
and scientists, have much knowledge that would be beneficial to
students. When speaking in the public schools, however, the clergy-
man should be careful not to say things that would tend to advance
his particular religion; neither should he speak derisively about other
sects or other religions. 143 Where the clergyman's remarks deal with
a theme having a secular purpose, and where the references to re-
ligious ideals are only incidental, there would appear to be no objec-
tion. Likewise, it would be proper for a clergyman to present an ob-
jective history of his faith."'4 Only when a visiting clergyman attempts
to impart sectarian ideas to the students should his remarks be con-
sidered an advancement of religion.
The practice of having members of the clergy ask invocations and
pronounce benedictions at commencement exercises could be attacked
139. Some schools cancelled baccalaureate services at the same time that they
discontinued Bible reading. See Lowry, The Case for the Traditional American
Middle Way in Church and State, 13 J. PUB. L. 447, 457-58 (1964); Trueblood, The
Paradox of the School Decision, Presbyterian Life, May 1, 1964, at 14.
140. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964).
141. 377 U.S. 402 (1964). See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952)
(taxpayer lacks standing to challenge religious exercises in public schools), discussed
in text accompanying note 12 supra.
142. See D. BOLES, supra note 29, at 293; Choper, supra note 45, at 407.
143. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 417.
144. Such lectures would no doubt be very appropriate in connection with the
objective religion courses. See note 185 infra and accompanying text.
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as advancing religion in that it tends to create a devotional setting.
If, however, these prayers are constructed with an emphasis on the
nation's religious heritage, with only incidental reference to the Deity,
they may well come within the Historical Document exception.145
C. Distribution of Bibles
When a New Jersey school board authorized the distribution of
Gideon Bibles146 to students whose parents had given permission, a
group of Jews and Catholics protested. The New Jersey Supreme
Court held, in a unanimous opinion, that this action was unconstitu-
tional in that it amounted to a preference of Protestantism over other
religions. 147 Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Vanderbilt said:
To permit the distribution of the King James version of the Bible in
the public schools of this State would be to cast aside all the progress made
in the United States and throughout New Jersey in the field of religious
toleration and freedom. We would be renewing the ancient struggles among
the various religious faiths to the detriment of all. This we must decline to
do.148
New Jersey clearly has taken the correct approach. 149 Not only is
the avowed purpose of the practice the advancement of the Christian
faith, but also it constitutes a preference of the Protestant denomi-
nations. The breach of the school district's duty of neutrality is
obvious.
The dissemination of religious pamphlets and devotional booklets
would appear to be just as much a preference of one religion over
others as is the distribution of Bibles. 50 It is submitted, therefore,
that the public schools should refrain from distributing religious liter-
145. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. See also Professor Choper's com-
ment that "Research has not revealed that listening to the invocation is contrary to
anyone's religious or conscientious beliefs." Choper, supra note 45, at 408.
146. The goal of the Gideons is "to win men and women for the Lord Jesus Christ,
through . . . (c) placing the Bible, God's Holy Word-or portions thereof in hotels,
hospitals, schools, institutions, and also through the distribution of same for personal
use." Quoted from the constitution of Gideons International in L. PFEFFEn, supra note
55, at 456.
147. Tudor v. Board of Educ., 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 816 (1954).
148. Id. at 52, 100 A.2d at 868.
149. Chief Justice Vanderbilt's reasoning has been followed by the Florida courts.
Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 128 So. 2d 181 (Fla. App. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 155 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1963). The attorneys general of Pennsylvania,
California, Washington, Colorado and Arizona have reached similar conclusions.
L. PFEFFFH, supra note 55, at 460. See also Choper, supra note 45, at 405-06.
150. See Miller v. Cooper, 56 N.M. 355, 244 P.2d 520 (1952), where distribution
of religious pamphlets by public schools was held to violate the duty of neutrality,
See also Note, The First Amendment and Distribution of Religious Literature in the
Public Schools, 41 VA. L. REv. 789, 807 (1955).
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ature of any type, including announcements of revival services or
vacation Bible schools.
151
The Bible, as well as other religious books, would, of course, be
appropriate in school libraries.152 To place religious materials on the
library shelves is not to prefer one religion over another, nor to aid
religion in general; it is merely a part of the school's duty to make
knowledge of all types available for "academic investigation."153
D. Wearing of Religious Garb by Public School Teachers
The wearing of religious garb by public school teachers has been
challenged on numerous occasions, usually on the ground that it vio-
lates state constitutional prohibitions against sectarian influence in the
public schools. In the absence of evidence that the nuns have in-
jected religious dogma into their teaching, most of the courts have
declined to enjoin the wearing of religious garb in the public schools.154
It scarcely could be denied, however, that such distinctive garb tends
to create a religious atmosphere in the classroom.15  Furthermore, in
view of the fact that the garb serves as a constant reminder of the
teacher's religious affiliation, and that children develop impressions
just as much from what they see as from what they hear,156 it would
not be difficult to conclude that the wearing of religious garb consti-
tutes sectarian influence. Although such influence may fall short of
sectarian "teaching," it would appear to have a "propagandizing ef-
151. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 416.
152. See Ladd, supra note 69, at 329.
153. See Choper, supra note 45, at 362 n.205. In Schempp v. School Dist., 201 F.
Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), the court enjoined the Abington Township school officials
from continuing the Bible reading exercises. Judge Biggs went on to state, however,
that "nothing herein shall be construed as interfering with or prohibiting the use of
any books or works as educational, source, or reference material." Id. at 820-21.
154. See, e.g., Rawlings v. Butler, 290 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1956); New Haven v.
Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 43 A.2d 455 (1945); State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217
Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940); Gerhardt v. Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127
(1936); Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School Dist., 164 Pa. 629, 30 A. 482 (1894).
After the Pennsylvania decision was rendered, the legislature quickly passed a law
prohibiting public school teachers from wearing religious garb. This law was held
constitutional in Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 A. 68 (1910). Administrative
regulations banning the wearing of religious garb and religious insignia also have
been upheld. See Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P.2d 949 (1951); O'Connor v.
Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906).
155. In his dissenting opinion in the Rawlings case, Judge Hogg emphasized the
fact that religious garb generates a religious atmosphere. He stated: "The distinctive
garbs, so exclusively peculiar to the Roman Catholic Church, create a religious
atmosphere in the schoolroom. They have a subtle influence upon the tender minds
being taught and trained by the nuns. In and of themselves they proclaim the Catholic
Church and the representative character of the teachers in the schoolroom. They silently
promulgate sectarianism." Rawlings v. Butler, supra note 154, at 809.
156. See Note, Religious Garb in the Public Schools-A Study in Conflicting Liberties,
22 U. Cm. L. REv. 888, 892-93 (1955).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [ VoL. 20
fect,"157 especially where the garb includes rosaries or other religious
insignia. 58 Practices which tend to create a reverent atmosphere and
which contain suggestions of a proselytizing purpose probably would
constitute sufficient sectarian influence to violate the constitutional
command of neutrality. Hence, the practice of wearing religious garb
in the public schools would appear to be an unconstitutional advance-
ment of religion.
The argument that the wearing of religious garb is protected by
the "free exercise" clause can be answered in two ways. First, the
religious liberty of one person may not be exercised so as to limit the
freedom of others. 59 Second, a prohibition against religious garb in
the public schools does not in any way interfere with a teacher's
freedom of belief; it merely means that during the period in which
she is employed as an agent of the state she cannot practice those
beliefs which constitute sectarian influence. 60
One court has disqualified all nuns from teaching in the public
schools, apparently on the ground that their lives are dedicated to
the teaching of religion.'6 ' It is unlikely, however, that the employ-
ment of nuns or ministers as teachers would violate the neutrality
concept if they wear no religious garb or insignia and if they take
care that their classroom comments contain no sectarian implica-
tions. 62 The fact that these nuns or ministers contribute their salaries
to religious purposes should have no bearing on the validity of their
157. In Zellers v. Huff, supra note 154, the court said: "Not only does the wearing
of religious garb and insignia have a propagandizing effect for the church, but by its
very nature it introduced sectarian religion into the school." 55 N.M. at 525, 236 P.2d
at 964.
158. Speaking of teachers wearing religious garb, Justice Williams of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court stated: "Wherever they go, this garb proclaims their church, their order,
and their separation from the secular world, as plainly as a herald could do if they
were constantly attended by such a person." Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School Dist.,
164 Pa. 629, 659, 30 A. 482, 485 (1894) (dissenting opinion).
159. See Note, supra note 156, at 892. See also Commonwealth v. Herr, supra
note 154, where the court stated: "The right of the individual to clothe himself in
whatever garb his taste, his inclination, the tenets of his sect, or even his religious
sentiments may dictate is no more absolute than his right to give utterance to his
sentiments, religious or otherwise." 229 Pa. at 143-44, 78 A. at 72.
160. Cf. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where the Court refused
to allow a religious belief as a defense against a polygamy prosecution. Speaking
for the Court, Mr. Chief Justice Waite stated: "Laws are made for the government
of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions,
they may with practices." Id. at 166. The North Dakota decision allowing the wearing
of religious garb in the public schools, supra note 154, was abrogated by a public
referendum in 1948. Thereafter, the Catholic bishops of the state announced that the
nuns would be permitted to wear "modest dress" while teaching; hence, they have
continued in their employment. See L. PFEFa, supra note 55, at 497-98. It would
appear, therefore, that the wearing of religious garb is not nearly so vital to a nun's
freedom of religion as the "free exercise argument" suggests.
161. Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163 S.W.2d 609 (1942).
162. See Harrison, supra note 29, at 416.
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employment. 163 No inquiry is made concerning the manner in which
other public school teachers dispose of their salaries, and there is no
reason why a different approach should be taken in regard to nun-
teachers or minister-teachers. Indeed, it is possible that any inquiry
concerning a teacher's disposition of his salary would violate the "free
exercise" clause.
16
E. Use of Public School Buildings for Religious Meetings
The use of public school buildings for religious meetings during
non-school hours has given rise to considerable litigation. Where state
statutes authorize school officials to make school premises available
for religious meetings165 or for non-school purposes,166 the courts have
generally sustained the use of public school buildings by religious
groups. Where there is no such statutory authorization, most of the
decisions have turned on a regular-temporary distinction. In those
instances where religious groups have been making regular and re-
peated use of the public school premises, the courts have generally
held such use unlawful' 67 or unconstitutional. 168 On the other hand,
the courts have generally sustained religious use of public school
premises where such use is only infrequent or on a temporary basis.
69
Clearly the "free exercise" clause would not compel a school dis-
trict to make its facilities available to religious groups. Even those
courts which have declined to enjoin religious use of school premises
163. See Choper, supra note 45, at 404.
164. In Gerhardt v. Heid, supra note 154, the court said: "The fact that the
teachers contributed a material portion of their earnings to the religious order of which
they are members is not violative of the Constitution. A person in the employ of the
state or any of its subdivisions is not inhibited from contributing money, which he or
she has earned by service so performed, for the support of some religious body of
which he or she is a member. To deny the right to make such contribution would
in itself constitute a denial of that right of religious liberty which the Constitution
guarantees." 66 N.D. at 460, 267 N.W. at 135.
165. E.g., Nichols v. School Directors, 93 I1. 61 (1879); State v. Kessler, 136 Mo.
App. 236, 117 S.W. 85 (1909).
166. E.g., Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So. 2d 697
(Fla. 1959); Hurd v. Walters, 48 Ind. 148 (1874); Townsend v. Hagan, 35 Iowa 194
(1872).
167. E.g., Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Mo. 301 (1878); Spencer v. Joint School-Dist., 15
Kan. 202 (1875); Scofield v. Eighth School Dist., 27 Conn. 498 (1858); Baggerly v.
Lee, 37 Ind. App. 139, 73 N.E. 921 (1905).
168. Bender v. Streabich, 182 Pa. 251, 37 A. 853 (1897).
169. In Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, supra note 166,
the Florida Supreme Court held that a school district "has the power to exercise a
reasonable discretion to permit the use of school buildings during non-school hours
for any legal assembly which includes religious meetings, subject, of course, to
judicial review should such discretion be abused to the point that it could be con-
strued as a contribution of public funds in aid of a particular religious group or as
the promotion or establishment of a particular religion." 115 So. 2d at 700-01. See
also State ex rel. Gilbert v. Dilley, 95 Neb. 527, 145 N.W. 999 (1914); Nichols v.
School Directors, supra note 165; Davis v. Boget, 50 Iowa 11 (1878).
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are quick to uphold a school district's refusal to allow its property to
be used for religious purposes. 7 ° The question, therefore, is whether
the action of a school district in granting permission to religious
groups to use school premises has the purpose or primary effect of
aiding one religion, aiding all religions, or preferring one religion
over others. It is argued that the school district is not aiding religion
if the religious groups are permitted to use the school premises only
during non-school hours and if they pay reasonable rent. Yet the pro-
hibition against the preference of one religion over others would
seem to require that permission for the use of school premises be
granted on a non-discriminatory basis. If the school district com-
plies with this third prerequisite, it is indeed possible that religious
groups would end up utilizing the school facilities more hours a week
than would the students. Not only would such a situation be likely
to interfere with the extra-curricular activities of student groups, but
also it likely would give rise to charges that the school district is
creating a religious atmosphere. At this point it becomes much more
difficult to say that the school district is not aiding religion. Where
religious groups are permitted to use public school premises on a
permanent or indefinite basis, it would appear that the school district
has violated its duty of neutrality.'7'
The aid to religion argument is less compelling, however, where
religious groups are permitted to use public school premises only on
an emergency basis. If the religious group faced with the emergency
pays reasonable rent for the use of the school facilities, if permission
for such use is limited to hours when the facilities are not being used
for student activities, and if the school district is willing to grant
similar permission to other religious groups faced with similar emer-
gencies, the courts may well be reluctant to find a breach of the
duty of neutrality. Indeed, it is possible that it would be considered
an acceptable accommodation between the first amendment's over-
lapping protections for a school district to make its facilities available
to religious groups faced with an emergency. 172
170. See, e.g., McKnight v. Board of Pub. Educ., 365 Pa. 422, 76 A.2d 207 (1950);
School Directors v. Toll, 149 Ill. App. 541 (1909); Boyd v. Mitchell, 69 Ark. 202, 62
S.W. 61 (1901); Eckhardt v. Darby, 118 Mich. 199, 76 N.W. 761 (1898); State ecx rel.
Greisinger v. Grand Rapids Bd. of Educ., 88 Ohio App. 364, 100 N.E.2d 294 (1949).
171. In Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, supra note 166, the
Florida Supreme Court cautioned that it would not allow a church to use public
school premises for a prolonged period of time unless there was evidence of "an im-
mediate intention on the part of the Church to construct its own building." The
court then stated that "it could hardly be contemplated that the public school system
or its property could be employed in the permanent promotion of any particular sect
or denomination." 115 So. 2d at 700.
172. In his concurring opinion in the Schempp case, Mr. Justice Brennan suggests
that it would not constitute a violation of the duty of neutrality for a state to
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As long as the emergency theory is invoked only in a true emer-
gency (as where a local congregation is permitted to use the school
auditorium for Sunday services while fire damage to its sanctuary is
being repaired 73), it may withstand a constitutional attack. The
theory will become vulnerable, however, if it is expanded to assist
new congregations or out-of-town religious groups in attracting fol-
lowers.
In situations where religious groups are using public school premises
for educational, cultural, or social (as opposed to religious) purposes,
it is unlikely that the courts would find a breach of the neutrality
concept. 74 When the religious groups do not create a devotional
atmosphere and do not pursue religious purposes while making use
of the school premises, it is indeed difficult to say that the school
district is guilty of advancing religion.
F. Rental of Church Buildings for Public School Purposes
Population growth, changes in economic conditions and other fac-
tors have brought about unexpected increases in public school enroll-
ment in many areas. In order to alleviate the overcrowded conditions
in the public schools, the school officials frequently rent additional
classroom space in buildings owned by churches and synagogues.
Although it has been suggested that the school district should be
required to show that the church buildings were the "best available
facilities,"17 5 most of the state courts have approved the rental of
church premises for public school purposes as long as the public school
officials have control over the instruction.
176
It would appear that the federal standard will require something
more than a mere showing of control over instruction. The constitu-
tional command of neutrality would surely require the school district
to remove all pictures, statues, or other religious symbols from the
leased premises. Also, where the leased premises are connected to the
church sanctuary, arrangements should be made for access to the class-
rooms other than through the sanctuary. In fact, it would be prefer-
able if the passageways between the leased premises and the sanc-
extend "temporary use of an empty public building to a congregation whose place of
worship has been destroyed by fire or flood." 374 U.S. at 299.
173. Cf. Lewis v. Mandeville, 201 Misc. 120, 107 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
where permission for a religious group to use the fire hall auditorium for religious
services while its place of worship was being repaired was held constitutional.
174. See County of Los Angeles v. Hollinger, 200 Cal. App. 2d 877, 19 Cal. flptr.
648 (1962) (Verdi's opera "Nabucco" held not a religious work).
175. See Choper, supra note 45, at 414.
176. E.g., New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 43 A.2d 455 (1945); State
ex tel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 348, 28 N.E.2d 256 (1940); Crain v. Walker, 222 Ky.
828, 2 S.W.2d 654 (1928); Millard v. Board of Educ., 121 Ill. 297, 10 N.E. 669
(1887). See also D. BOLFS, supra note 29, at 164-67.
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tuary were blocked during school hours. It is uncertain whether
the neutrality concept would require the school district to show that
it is making plans to erect additional public school facilities and that
the rental of church premises is only temporary. Even if a temporary-
permanent distinction is made, it would seem that "temporary" rental
could continue for two or three years without question. The prob-
lems which a school district faces in planning and financing new
facilities are necessarily complex, and the lapse of time between the
initial planning stage and the completion of construction could well
be considerable.
It is true that the pupils assigned to these leased classrooms will
see the cross on the adjoining church or the six-pointed star on the
adjoining synagogue. Yet it is very unlikely that the duty of neutrality
would require the school district to insulate pupils from religious
symbols located on adjoining property.177 The duty of neutrality does
not forbid a school district from erecting a public school next to a
church or from explaining to the children that religious groups com-
monly have distinctive symbols; it merely forbids the school district
to display religious symbols on public school property.
7 8
G. Religious Tests for Teachers
When a school district asks prospective teachers whether or not
they believe in God, it might not be violating the "no establishment"
clause. 17 9 On the other hand, it seems clear that such a question vio-
lates the "free exercises" clause. In Torcaso v. Watkins,180 the United
States Supreme Court struck down a Maryland law requiring a public
official to declare his belief in the existence of God on the ground
that it "unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief
177. In Brown v. Heller, 51 Misc. 2d 660, 273 N.Y.S.2d 713, 717 (Sup. Ct. 1966),
the court said: "It may be doubted that the constitutional requirement obligates the
school authorities to insulate the pupils so carefully as to prevent them from
seeing religious emblems on other properties. Such a ruling would lead to strange
results. Public schools could then only be built out of sight and beyond earshot of
churches and other religious structures. School buildings would have to be torn
down if a church should later be constructed next door or on an adjoining block.
School buses would have to be routed so as not to pass a church on the way to and
from school."
178. See notes 126 & 127 supra and accompanying text.
179. In Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 143 So. 2d 21 (Fla.
1962), it was alleged that school officials asked each applicant for a teaching position
the question "Do you believe in God?" In the brief filed on behalf of the plaintiffs,
Leo Pfeffer argued that the question violated the "no establishment" clause because
it favored religion over irreligion and preferred theistic religions over non-theistic
religions. See R. DnsuN , supra note 31, at 66. The constitutionality of the question
was not determined because none of the plaintiffs was a teacher. Chamberlin v. Dade
County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1964).
180. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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and religion."' 8' Although the Torcaso holding invalidated religious
tests for "public officials," it seems to be agreed that it would be
equally applicable to religious tests for teachers. 8 2 It is recognized,
of course, that any teacher taking advantage of his position to prose-
lytize for his particular religion or against all religion would properly
be subject to discipline or dismissal.1m
H. Religious Census Among Students
A religious census among pupils would fall in the same category
as a religious test for teachers. 8" It need not be decided whether
such a census would have the effect of advancing religion, for it is
evident that it would violate the "free exercise" clause. By calling
upon the children to place themselves in one of the religious cate-
gories, the school officials are inquiring about a personal matter which
the children may not wish to discuss. While the teachers and officials
in the public schools may properly explore with the students the
important religious events of history, it is not their function to ask
the students to declare themselves for or against religious principles
of any type.
V. NEw IDEAS FOR "AccoMMODATION"
A. Objective Religion Courses
The constitutional command of neutrality does not require the elimi-
nation from public education of all teaching about religion and re-
ligious differences. In fact, in the majority opinion in the Schempp
case, Mr. Justice Clark said:
[O]ne's education is not complete without a study of comparative re-
ligion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for
its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that
such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part
of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with
the First Amendment. 185
181. Id. at 496.
182. See R. DmNAN, supra note 31, at 66-67; A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note
21, at 396.
183. Plaintiff's brief in the Chamberlin case stated: "It is important to note that we
are not challenging the right of the school authorities to dismiss or otherwise discipline
a teacher who uses or abuses his office to promote atheistic doctrines. All we challenge
is their right to refuse to engage an otherwise qualified teacher simply because he will
not assert that he believes in God." Quoted in R. DRINAx, supra note 31, at 66-67.
184. The religious census question was raised in the Chamberlin case, but it was
not decided because plaintiffs had not shown that their children had been questioned
in that connection. Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 160 So. 2d
97 (Fla. 1964).
185. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). See also the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan at 300-01.
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Since the Schempp decision, many secondary schools have insti-
tuted "objective religion courses."186 Some of these courses are taught
by English teachers and emphasize the literary qualities of the Bible.18
Some are taught by history teachers and emphasize the historical
qualities of the Bible. Still others are taught by philosophy teachers
and emphasize the comparative or phenomenological aspects of re-
ligion. Such courses are, of course, offered on an elective basis. Al-
though some schools have asked local religious groups to supply teach-
ers for their religion courses,'m most have deemed it preferable to
delegate the task to members of the secular faculty.18 9
Because of the possibility that the study of religion may result in
some indoctrination, some have suggested that the objective religion
courses should be limited to the upper high school grades-a level
where students would have sufficient maturity to distinguish between
indoctrination and academic discussion. 90 Others would see no prob-
lem with an objective presentation of religion in the elementary
grades, provided that the teacher does not emphasize any one belief
over others. 91 Objective religion courses, apparently for the entire
school system, were commended at a recent session of the general
assembly of the National Council of Churches. Dr. Arthur S. Fleming,
the newly-installed president, declared:
I believe every school child should have the opportunity to find out about
religion, just as he has the opportunity to find out about economics, politics,
and other fairly controversial areas .... Religious illiteracy is rampant in
this country, and it is time we launched a frontal attack on it.192
B. More Released Time
Along side the Engel and Schempp holdings forbidding the use of
the public school program for the promotion of religious exercises and
religious indoctrination, there is the Zorach accommodation principle.
Some have insisted that Zorach is clearly wrong.193 Some have said
186. See W. KATz, supra note 38, at 50-56; Phenix, Religion in American Public
Schools, 1965 RELIGION AND T=E PUBLIC ORDER 82-109 (Giannella ed. 1966).
187. Professor William Lyon Phelps of Yale University lauded the literary qualities
of the Bible. He explained: "The Bible has within its pages every single kind of
literature that any proposed list of English classics contains. It has narrative, descrip-
tive, poetical, dramatic, and oratorical passages. . . . Priests, atheists, skeptics, devotees,
agnostics and evangelists are all agreed that the Bible is the best example of English
composition that the world has ever seen. It contains the noblest prose and poetry with
the utmost simplicity of diction." Quoted in D. BOLES, supra note 29, at 276.
188. Harrison, supra note 29, at 406-07.
189. Phenix, supra note 186, at 109.
190. See P. FERN & R. UzacH, supra note 80, at 42-45.
191. See Choper, supra note 45, at 379-86.
192. Nashville Tennessean, Dec. 10, 1966, at 5, col. 4.
193. See Choper, supra note 45, at 387-400; Pfeffer, Released Time and Religious
Liberty: A Reply, 53 MiGH. L. REv. 91 (1954); Note, Released Time Reconsidered:
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that the two approaches are consistent only if the released time pro-
gram is of a "dismissed time" nature (that is, those not choosing to
attend the religious instruction classes would be free to go home).194
Still others have drawn a careful distinction between a state's promo-
tion of religious faith by means of state-composed prayers or Bible
reading in the public schools and the state's willingness to excuse
students from the regular school program for an hour a week in order
that they may attend Bible classes in the local churches. 9 -
This third viewpoint, known as the accommodation approach, ap-
pears to be the one which will prevail. There is a major difference
between a state-sponsored religious exercise as a part of the public
school program and the accommodation of the public school pro-
gram to the religious needs of the community. 196 If the student
body includes Moslems, surely the school officials would permit
them to leave the classrooms at the appointed hour to say their
prayers toward Mecca; in fact, a refusal to make such an accommo-
dation might very well be a violation of the "free exercise" clause.
197
Similar "free exercise" considerations surround the released time ac-
commodation. Furthermore, the schools regularly allow students to
miss classes in order to attend religious services which have special
The New York Plan Is Tested, 61 YALE L.J. 405 (1952). Although Professor Choper
argues that the Zorach-type plan violates the "no establishment" clause, he would
allow public schools to release students for a limited period of time each week "on
condition that they attend one of a group of extra-curricular education classes-for
example, classes in music, art, religion, drama ... " Choper, supra note 45, at 394.
194. See W. K-rz, supra note 38, at 49-50. See also Cushman, Public Support of
Religious Education in American Constitutional Law, 45 ILL. L. REv. 333, 354-56
(1950); Sullivan, Religious Education in the Schools, 14 LAw & CONTEM. PROB. 92, 93
(1949); Note, The Constitution and Released Time, 52 COLum. L. REV. 1033 (1952).
195. See Kauper, supra note 22, at 1045. See also Kauper, Church, State, and
Freedom: A Review, 52 Micr. L. REv. 829, 838-42 (1954); Kauper, Released Time
and Religious Liberty: A Further Reply, 53 MIcH. L. REv. 233 (1954).
196. There is apparently some difference of opinion among educators and religious
leaders concerning the effectiveness of the released time program. For a discussion
of the arguments for and against released time see L. PFEFFER, supra note 55, at 368-
435. Professor Kauper has suggested that the program might be improved by moving the
emphasis from religion to ethics and morality. In addition, he feels that such a
change in scope would bolster the constitutional argument. He reasons: "If the state
has an appropriate interest in character building and promotion of good citizenship,
it should be appropriate for the public school system to permit release of children
for the kind of instruction, whether religious or not, which the parents feel most
relevant for this purpose." P. KAuPER, supra note 81, at 97-98.
197. In Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1965), Judge Friendly
said: "We are not here required to consider such cases as that of a Moslem, obliged
to prostrate himself five times daily in the direction of Mecca, or of a child whose
beliefs forbade his partaking of milk and cookies without saying the blessings of his
faith. . . . So far as appears, the school authorities might well permit students to
withdraw momentarily for such necessary observances-or to forego the milk and
cookies, just as they excuse children on holidays important to their religions."
1967] NOTES iiii
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
significance to their beliefs. To release students on a mass basis so
that those who wish to obtain religious instruction may do so would
appear to be no different than excusing students on an individual
basis.'918
It is to be cautioned, however, that a released time program will
run afoul of the "no establishment" clause if public school officials
do anything to coerce the students to attend the religion classes.00
Likewise, a released time arrangement will be invalid if there is a
commingling of religious and secular instruction. If the religion
classes are held in a building which directly adjoins the building used
for secular classes and if the religious instruction is given by the
secular teachers, a commingling has occurred and the plan must be
struck down.200
C. Shared Time
Under the "shared time" plan, a student would spend half of his
school day in a parochial school and half in a public school.20' At the
parochial school he would be taught such value-laden subjects as
history, literature and the social sciences. At the public school he
would receive instruction in such religiously neutral subjects as
mathematics, physics, chemistry, languages, physical education, in-
dustial arts and home economics.
Some have defended the shared time plan as "released time in
reverse."202  Since any child has a constitutional right to attend a
parochial school,203 and since it is constitutional for public schools to
excuse students who wish to participate in off-the-premises religious
instruction,0 4 it is argued that it would surely be constitutional for
198. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952), the Supreme Court stated:
"A Catholic student applies to his teacher for permission to leave the school during
hours on a Holy Day of Obligation to attend a mass. A Jewish student asks his teacher
for permission to be excused for Yom Kippur. A Protestant wants the afternoon off
for a family baptismal ceremony. In each case the teacher requires parental consent
in writing. In each case the teacher, in order to make sure the student is not a
truant, goes further and requires a report from the priest, the rabbi, or the minister.
The teacher in other words cooperates in a religious program to the extent of
making it possible for her students to participate in it. Whether she does it occa-
sionally for a few students, regularly for one, or pursuant to a systematized program
designed to further the religious needs of all the students does not alter the character
of the act."
199. See W. DOUGLAs, THE BIBLE AND THE ScnooLs 10-11 (1966); Kauper, supra
note 195, at 842; Note, supra note 194, at 1037-39.
200. Moore v. Board of Educ., 4 Ohio Misc. 257, 212 N.E.2d 833 (C.P. 1965).
201. The shared time concept is not new. In 1822 Thomas Jefferson invited religious
groups to establish schools adjacent to the University of Virginia so that their students
could attend the secular classes at the University and have the use of the University
library. Jefferson's letter is quoted in Sky, The Establishment Clause, The Congress
and the Schools: An Historical Perceptive, 52 VA. L. BEv. 1395, 1455 (1966).
202. See W. KATZ, supra note 38, at 78-79; L. PFEFFER, supra note 55, at 578-79.
203. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
204. Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 198.
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the public schools to enroll parochial school students on a part-time
basis. Others have defended the dual enrollment arrangement on
the ground that every child has a right to a public education. For a
school district to permit students to exercise only half of that right
so that they may also attend classes in parochial schools is considered
an acceptable accommodation in the interest of religious liberty.
2 5
Although it can be argued that the shared time plan constitutes
aid to religion in that it relieves the parochial schools of the neces-
sity of purchasing expensive laboratory, gymnasium and manual train-
ing equipment, it is doubtful whether this is the type of aid which
would violate the "no establishment" clause. The purpose of the
plan is not to advance religion, but to accommodate the public school
schedule to meet the religious needs of the students. Any advantages
which might accrue to the parochial school as a result of the plan
would be incidental to the valid accommodation purpose.2°6 It is
submitted, therefore, that as long as the shared time plan is made
available to all private and parochial school students on a non-
discriminatory basis, there would be no violation of the public school's
duty of neutrality.
There are, of course, administrative problems to be worked out if
the plan is to operate effectively and efficiently,20 7 but many writers
consider that shared time plans hold great promise for reconciling the
felt needs for religious instruction with the secular limitations placed
on the public schools.2 0 8 In fact, a National Education Association
survey in 1964 showed that a total of thirty-five states had one or
more school systems with a shared time program in operation.20 9
205. See Morton v. Board of Educ., 69 Ill. App. 2d 38, 216 N.E.2d 305 (1966);
Katz, Note on the Constitutionality of Shared Time, 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC
ORnm, 85, 89 (Giannella ed. 1965); Sky, supra note 201, at 1453-54. Cf. Common-
wealth ex rel. Wehrle v. School Dist., 241 Pa. 224, 88 A. 481 (1913) (sustaining
admission of parochial school students to public school manual training program).
206. See Katz, supra note 205, at 89.
207. See A. SToKEs & L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at 389-95, for a discussion of the
Philadelphia shared time arrangement. For a discussion of other shared time plans see
Powell, Shared Time, 1964: A Turning Point?, 1964 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER
62 (Ciannella ed. 1965). The arguments for and against shared time are summarized
in L. PFEFFER, supra note 55, at 574-76, and in DuKER, THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND REL.I-
GioN 221-24 (1966). See generally LYNN, PROTESTANT STRATEGIES IN EDUCATION
(1964).
208. See Kauper, supra note 22, at 1067; Powell, supra note 207, at 83-84. The
National Council of Churches recently issued the following statement: "We believe
that boys and girls now limited by the resources of some religious day schools will
be benefited by the equipment and program offerings for the portion of the time
they attend public school. We believe that benefits will ensue for all children if
those now enrolled in separate systems have the opportunity to associate with each
other through dual school enrollment. We believe that this association and inter-
mingling of the children in the school will result in a broadened support for public
education and will serve to unify our now partially divided communities." Quoted in
L. PFrEFFER, supra note 55, at 576-77.
209. See A. STOKES & L. PFEFER, supra note 21, at 390; Powell, supra note 207, at
19671] NOTES 1113
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VI. STANDING To SUE
The question of standing was not mentioned at all in Everson and
was passed over quickly in McCollum. Yet in Doremus v. Board of
Education10 the Supreme Court refused to review the New Jersey
ruling upholding Bible reading in the public schools because the pe-
titioner lacked standing. Although the Court mentioned that the pe-
titioner's child had graduated prior to the taking of the appeal, the
holding appears to rest on the ground that the petitioner had not
presented a "good-faith pocketbook action."21'
Since the petitioners in Engel alleged neither loss of tax revenue
nor coercion on the part of school officials, their action would not
appear to meet the "pocketbook test" laid down in Doremus. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court reached the merits without any discus-
sion of standing. It appears that the mere status of the petitioners as
parents of school children was deemed a sufficient basis for stand-
ing.21
2
It is this parental status which the Court used in Schempp to justify
the petitioners' attack on Bible reading. Mr. Justice Clark, who wrote
the majority opinion, gives no indication that plaintiff-parents must
prove any "adverse" effect on their children; he merely states that
"the parties here . . . are directly affected by the laws and practices
against which their complaints are directed," and concludes that
"[t]hese interests surely suffice to give the parties standing to com-
plain."2
13
Although the Doremus "pocketbook test" has not been expressly
overruled,2 14 the Engel and Schempp decisions appear to say that an
73-75. The Elementary & Secondary Education Act of 1965 includes "dual enrollment"
among the services for which federal funds may be used. It is very likely, therefore,
that the shared time arrangement will become more popular in the future. For a dis-
cussion of the various aspects of the 1965 Act see Sky, supra note 201, at 1441-66;
Note, The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the First Amendment,
41 IND. L.J. 302 (1966).
210. 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
211. The Court reiterated the condition set forth in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), that there must be a direct dollars-and-cents injury before a tax-
payer has standing to challenge governmental conduct.
212. See Drinan, Standing to Sue in Establishment Cases, 1965 RELxIoN AND T.li
PUBuc ORDER 161, 180-81 (Giannella ed. 1966). See generally Brown, Quis Custodict
Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 15-31.
213. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963). Mr. Justice
Brennan discusses the standing question in his concurring opinion. Among other
things, he suggests that "the parent is surely the person most directly and immediately
concerned about and affected by the challenged establishment, and to deny him
standing either in his own right or on behalf of his child might effectively foreclose
judicial inquiry into serious breaches of the prohibitions of the First Amendment-even
though no special monetary injury could be shown." Id. at 266 n.30.
214. It has been suggested that the Doremus case has been overruled "sub silentio."
Drinan, supra note 212, at 180; Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HAnv.
L. REv. 25,35 (1962).
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alleged violation of the "no establishment" clause in and of itself
creates a right in a parent to challenge public school activity.
2 15
The Chamberlin case merely limits a parent's challenge to practices
prevailing at the grade level in which his child is enrolled. In situ-
ations where parents are reluctant to challenge "no establishment"
clause violations because of social or economic pressure, it is possible
that the Court will extend standing to other interested persons.
216
VII. CONsTrruTIoNAL AMENDMENT
Within a few months of the Schempp decision, over one hundred
proposals for a constitutional amendment were introduced in the
Congress. 17 Because Congressman Frank Becker (R-N.Y.) threat-
ened to use a discharge petition if the House Judiciary Committee
did not hold hearings, his proposal received dominant attention. The
Becker Amendment read as follows:
Section 1. Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit the
offering, reading from, or listening to prayers or biblical scriptures, if par-
ticipation therein is on a voluntary basis, in any governmental or public
school, institution, or place.
Section 2. Nothing in this Constitution shall be deemed to prohibit mak-
ing reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the aid of God or a
Supreme Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding, ac-
tivity, ceremony, school, institution, or place, or upon any coinage, cur-
rency, or obligation of the United States.
Section 3. Nothing in this Article shall constitute an establishment of
religion. 218
At the hearings, which were held from April 22 through June 3,
1964, over one hundred congressmen expressed their support for the
amendment. Yet there was a solid front of opposition. Expressing
their distaste for the amendment were such distinguished church lead-
ers as Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, chief executive officer of the United
Presbyterian Church; Dr. Edwin Tuller, general secretary of the
American Baptist Convention; Dr. Fredrik Schiotz, president of the
American Lutheran Church; Presiding Bishop Arthur Lichtenberger
of the Protestant Episcopal Church; and Bishop John Wesley Lord
of the Methodist Church.219 United Church of Christ, Unitarian,
215. See Drinan, supra note 212, at 181-83.
216. Professor Choper argues that every citizen has "the 'right' to be free from
social pressures to conform to the majority's religious practices that are governmentally
sponsored," and he contends that the standing rules must be liberalized if this right
is to be adequately protected. Choper, supra note 45, at 364-67.
217. See Katz, supra note 63, at 398.
218. H.R.J. Res. 693, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
219. See Beaney & Beiser, supra note 56, at 499.
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Seventh Day Adventist and Jewish officials also opposed the amend-
ment.
220
Equally impressive, and perhaps more significant, was the parade
of legal scholars who testified against the amendment. Included in
this group were professors Paul A. Freund of Harvard, Philip B. Kur-
land of Chicago, Paul E. Kauper of Michigan, Wilbur G. Katz of
Wisconsin, James C. Kirby of Vanderbilt and Jefferson B. Fordham
of Pennsylvania. In addition, a statement of opposition signed by 223
law school deans and professors was presented to the committee near
the close of the hearings.22'
As political observers had predicted, the Becker Amendment was
never reported out of committee.
In 1966 Senator Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.) took up the prayer
cause and introduced a constitutional amendment aimed at "clarify-
ing" the Supreme Court decisions. His proposal, which was much less
sweeping than the Becker Amendment, read as follows:
Nothing contained in this Constitution shall prohibit the authority ad-
ministering any school, school system, educational institution or other public
building supported in whole or in part through the expenditure of public
funds from providing for or permitting the voluntary participation by stu-
dents or others in prayer. Nothing contained in this article shall authorize
any such authority to prescribe the form or content of any prayer.222
Senator Dirksen's amendment drew criticism from the National
Council of Churches and a large number of Protestant church leaders.
When the Senate voted in September of 1966, Senator Dirksen found
himself nine votes short of the required two-thirds majority.2m
220. See D. BoLEs supra note 29, at 299-300.
221. The statement read in part as follows: "American liberties have been secure
in large measure because they have been guaranteed by a Bill of Rights which the
American people have until now deemed practically unamendable. If now, for the
first time, an amendment to 'narrow its operation' is adopted, a precedent will have
been established which may prove too easy to follow when other controversial
decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights are handed down. . . .Whatever disagreement
some may have with the Bible-Prayer decisions, we believe strongly that they do not
justify this experiment." Quoted in D. BoLEs, upra note 29, at 314-15.
222. S.J. Res. 148, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Senator Dirkscn's proposed
amendment not only would have codified the principle announced in Engel, but also
would have sanctioned student-initiated prayers of some type. For a discussion of
student-initiated prayers see note 73 supra and accompanying text.
223. Sky, supra note 201, at 1398-1400. The "Sense of the Congress" resolution
proposed by Senator Birch Bayh (D-Ind.) was also rejected, mainly because of
Senator Dirksen's quip that it was "absolutely meaningless." The resolution would
have declared the sense of the Congress to be that nothing in the Supreme Court
decisions prohibits local school districts "from permitting individual students to engage
in silent, voluntary prayer or meditation." Nashville Tennessean, Sept. 22, 1966, at
16, col. 1.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: "No ESTABLISHMENT" VERSUS
"FREE EXERCISE"
The duty of the public schools to maintain neutrality in the area
of religion is not an express constitutional command; rather it is
derived from two separate and potentially conflicting clauses in the
first amendment. The "no establishment" clause prohibits any attempt
to aid religion or to prefer one religion over others. The "free exer-
cise" clause, on the other hand, guarantees to every citizen the right
to the free exercise of his religion without interference by the state.
It is perhaps of significance that the "no establishment" clause pre-
cedes the "free exercise" clause, yet the conclusion is inescapable
that the two clauses were intended to operate together in harmony.
The conflicting policies of the two clauses must be balanced and
reconciled.
A strict theory of neutrality would require the state to be indifferent
to religion. Yet indifference to religion could well constitute govern-
mental sanction for a philosophy of secularism, thus creating a policy
of governmental hostility to religion. Such a hostile attitude would
clearly infringe upon the free exercise guarantee, for the "free exer-
cise" clause implies that the state is under a duty to maintain "a
hospitable climate for religious liberty."22 It is apparent, therefore,
that the development of the neutrality concept cannot proceed solely
on the basis of the "no establishment" prohibition. The "free exercise"
clause demands that the neutrality concept recognize that "[w]e are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being."225
The neutrality which results is clearly something other than a strict
neutrality. Because it undertakes to balance "free exercise" with "no
establishment," it could perhaps be described as a "benevolent neu-
trality" 2 6 or as an accommodation neutrality.227
The Supreme Court attempted to define this accommodation theory
in Abington School District v. Schempp - by holding that the state
is under a duty to avoid any activity which would have the purpose
224. P. KA uF'a, supra note 81, at 87. '
225. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
226. See Kauper, Schempp and Sherbert: Studies in Neutrality and Accommodation,
1963 RELIGIN AND THE PuBLIc ORDER 3, 16-28 (Giannella ed. 1964). In the
majority opinion in the Schempp case, Mr. Justice Clark referred to a "wholesome"
neutrality. 374 U.S. at 222. Apparently Professor Kauper is of the opinion that the
word "benevolent" better describes the balancing process than does the word "whole-
some.
227. The majority opinion in the Zorach case states: "When the state encourages
religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule
of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then
respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to
their spiritual needs." 343 U.S. at 313-14 (emphasis added).
228. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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or primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. The theory
was further defined in Sherbert v. Verner,2 9 wherein the Supreme
Court held that religious convictions respecting a day of worship must
be respected by a state in determining whether a person is qualified
for unemployment compensation benefits. The Schempp and Sherbert
cases clearly reject the notion that the state should be strictly neutral
with respect to religious matters. They stand for the proposition that
notwithstanding the "no establishment" clause, a state may, and in
some instances must, accommodate its activity to further the religious
interests protected by the "free exercise" clause.20 The "no establish-
ment" clause remains a "wall of separation" prohibiting governmental
activity which tends to indoctrinate or which has a "pervading re-
ligious character."2 31 Yet the accommodation theory will sustain gov-
ernmental activity in which the secular purpose is paramount and
the religious reference only incidental. Likewise, it will sustain gov-
ernmental involvement in religious matters if such involvement is
only slight compared with the religious interests of the community.
The application of the neutrality and accommodation concepts in
the public school situation is a most delicate task.23 The schools
must not advance religion, yet they must not be so blind to religious
values that they begin to further atheism or agnosticism. Resolution
of the conflicting duties should proceed, it is submitted, according to
the following standard: the "no establishment" prohibition must take
precedence wherever the school district involves itself in religious
matters to the extent of sanctioning sectarian indoctrination, creating
a distinctively religious atmosphere, or preferring one system of be-
liefs over others. Thus, where state-composed prayers, teacher-spon-
sored prayers, the Lord's Prayer, or Bible readings are made a part
of a devotional exercise, the school district definitely has violated
the "no establishment" clause. It has likewise embarked upon un-
229. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
230. See Kauper, supra note 226, at 36-39.
231. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, supra note 228, at 224.
232. The majority opinion in the Schempp case states: "In the relationship between
man and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality. Though
the application of that rule requires interpretation of a delicate sort, the rule itself
is clearly and concisely stated in the words of the First Amendment." 374 U.S. at 226
(emphasis added).
233. In his recent book, Mr. Justice Douglas makes the following observations: "As
to prayers in public schools, we should remember that public schools are supported
by all sects-nonbelievers as well as believers, by minorities as well as by the majority.
In America public schools have a unique public function to perform. They are designed
to train American students in an atmosphere that is free from parochial, sectarian,
and separatist influences. The heritage they seek to instill is one that all sects, all
races, all groups have in common. It is not atheistic nor is it theistic. It is a civic
and patriotic heritage that transcends all differences among people, that bridges the
gaps in sectarian creeds, that cements all in a common unity of nationality, and that
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constitutional activity when it "celebrates" religious holidays, displays
religious symbols, holds baccalaureate services, distributes religious
literature, or permits its property to be used for the erection of a
nativity scene.21
4
On the other hand, the balancing effect of the "free exercise"
clause gives the school district considerable freedom to arrange its
program of instruction in order to accommodate the religious needs
of the students. While the public school may not sponsor activities
designed to advance religion, it may (and indeed should) develop a
teaching program that will help to create an awareness of and an
appreciation for the religious factors prevailing in society. Thus, ob-
jective religion courses and "explanations" of religious holidays are
manifestly acceptable accommodations. The accommodation theory
also permits activity which has a valid secular purpose and only
incidental reference to religion. Hence, it is entirely appropriate for
the school district to open the school day with a period of silence
or with a patriotic ceremony, to make use of religious art and religious
music in the fine arts classes, or to encourage classroom discussions
concerning morality and virtue. While such accommodations as off-
the-premises released time programs, shared time plans and allow-
ances for student-initiated prayers are not necessarily justifiable under
the secular purpose theory, they would appear to be justified on the
ground that the governmental involvement is only slight in relation
to the religious needs of the students.
It is apparent, therefore, that the duty of neutrality which the first
amendment imposes upon the public school is not of an absolute
nature. Rather it is a duty which requires that the "free exercise'
clause be balanced with the "no establishment" clause. The total
program of the public school must be guided by this balancing con-
cept of neutrality-a concept that prohibits the schools from either
propagating or ignoring religious values.
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reduces differences that emphasis on race, creed, and sect only accentuate." W. DoUGLAS,
supra note 199, at 58-59.
234. That a majority of the residents within a particular school district have no
objection to such religious influences in the public school is no answer to the con-
stitutional command. The first amendment is an exception to the doctrine of majority
rule. Its purpose is two-fold: to prevent the majority from imposing its religion on
the minority, and to prevent religious strife from erupting. Today's majority may
well be tomorrow's minority. If today's majority is permitted to place devotional
exercises in the public school there would surely be trouble should the complexion of
the community change. It is just such a clash that the "no establishment" clause was
intended to avert. For a discussion of the majority-rule-versus-minority-rights contro-
versy see Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 51-53 (W.D. Mich. 1965); D. BOLES,
supra note 29, at 334-43; W. DouGLAs, supra note 199, at 47-58.
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